Canadian Journal of Family Law
Volume 26

Number 2

2010

Newborn Adoption: Birth Mothers, Genetic Fathers, and
Reproductive Autonomy
Lori Chambers

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/can-j-fam-l
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Lori Chambers, "Newborn Adoption: Birth Mothers, Genetic Fathers, and Reproductive Autonomy" (2010)
26:2 Can J Fam L 339.

The University of British Columbia (UBC) grants you a license to use this article under the Creative Commons
Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. If you wish to use this
article or excerpts of the article for other purposes such as commercial republication, contact UBC via the
Canadian Journal of Family Law at cdnjfl@interchange.ubc.ca

NEWBORN ADOPTION: BIRTH
MOTHERS, GENETIC FATHERS, AND
REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY
Lori Chambers*
Abstract:
Overwhelmingly,
Canadian-born
children
relinquished for newborn adoption have been born to
unmarried mothers. Under provincial adoption acts, in cases of
‘illegitimacy’ only the mother’s consent was necessary for a
child to be eligible for adoption. Since adoption statutes were
introduced, however, the distinctions between those born
within and outside of marriage have been eliminated at law.
Provincial legislation now recognizes a wide range of
unmarried men as fathers, lists circumstances under which
paternity will be presumed and provides for the use of genetic
testing. But this raises significant questions in the context of
newborn adoption. Whose consent is required to relinquish a
child? In this paper it is argued that the unfettered right to
release a newborn child for third party adoption is an essential
component of women’s reproductive autonomy. It is also
essential to women’s dignity and equality rights, and to the
right to liberty and security of the person. To illustrate this
argument, consent provisions are contextualized by explicating
the disrespect for unmarried birth mothers that has been
central to adoption regimes. This is contrasted with the
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expanding rights of non-marital fathers under Charter
litigation. With regard to newborn adoption, Charter reasoning
has delivered equality with a vengeance. Relinquishment
should be considered an issue of reproductive freedom, not a
question of custody. Interference in the birth mother’s decision
making process violates her s.15 right to equality; the on-going
poverty and discrimination faced by single mothers are erased
when the genetic claims of men are considered to give them
equal standing with mothers in adoption cases. Moreover,
women’s s.7 rights to liberty and security of the person are
vitiated when men can interfere with adoption placement,
forcing women to abort or to retain custody themselves.
INTRODUCTION
Adoption is a statutory invention that allows a child to become
the full legal child of a non-biological parent.1 Historically, and
in the public mind, adoption was believed to be an altruistic
mechanism for ‘saving’ unfortunate children; as Karen
Dubinsky argues, “ideologies and images of rescue”2 are

1

Adoption has a long informal history. Moreover, statutory adoption is
used in contexts beyond that explored in this article: newborn
adoption by strangers. It is common for step-parents to adopt the
biological children of their partners and adoption is used in same-sex
families and surrogacy cases to formalize intentional parenthood
decisions.

2

Karen Dubinsky, Babies Without Borders: Adoption and Migration
Across the Americas (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at
95. While she makes this argument only in regard to international
adoption, it is equally relevant in the domestic context. The trope of
rescue has been challenged, as she also illustrates, particularly in the
international context, by horror stories of child-kidnapping and baby
selling. While there is no doubt that women have been subjected to
pressure in the adoption context, and that extra-legal schemes for
stealing babies have been an on-going problem, it is a foundational
assertion of this article that adoption, properly regulated, is an
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foundational to adoption practice. But from what and from
whom were (and are) children to be saved? What children
would be available for adoption and under what conditions?
Overwhelmingly, Canadian-born children relinquished for
newborn adoption have been born to unmarried mothers. Under
provincial adoption acts, in cases of ‘illegitimacy’ only the
mother’s consent was necessary for a child to be eligible for
adoption. Since adoption statutes were introduced, however,
the distinctions between those born within and outside of
marriage have been eliminated at law.3 Provincial legislation
now recognizes a wide range of unmarried men as fathers, lists
circumstances under which paternity will be presumed, and
provides for the use of genetic testing.4 But this raises
significant questions in the context of newborn adoption.5
important option for birth mothers and that it can be good for birth
mothers, their children and adoptive families.
3

In Ontario, for example, affiliation proceedings were abolished on
March 31, 1978 and the legal designation ‘illegitimate’ was made
obsolete in 1980. See: Diana Dzwiekowski, “Casenotes: Findings of
Paternity in Ontario, Sayer v. Rollin” (1980) 3 Can J Fam L 318 and
Family Law Reform Act, RSO (1980), c 152, s 1(a). The intent of
such reforms was clearly ameliorative: “the CLRA was intended to
remove disabilities suffered by children born outside of
marriage…The (Ontario Law Reform) Commission therefore
‘accorded high priority to finding a means by which the child born
outside marriage may be allowed to enjoy the same rights and
privileges as other children in our society’. The Commission's central
recommendation was that Ontario should abolish the concepts of
legitimacy and illegitimacy and declare positively that all children
have equal status in law. The Commission's recommendations were
enacted into legislation in the form of Parts I and II of the CLRA:”
AA v BB, 2007 ONCA 2 at para 20.

4

Ontario, Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO (1990), c C.12, ss 1-77.

5

Most provincial birth registries and vital statistics provisions still
allow the mother to register an infant alone, but registration is subject
to revision, even against the will of the mother. For further
information on vital statistics and the registration of birth, see:
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Alberta, Vital Statistics Act, Alta Reg 322/2000, s 2.1; British
Columbia, Vital Statistics Act, BC Reg 69/82, s 4; Manitoba, Vital
Statistics Act, CCSM, c V60, s 3, enacted as RSM 1987, c V60; New
Brunswick, Vital Statistics Act, NB Reg 87-30; Newfoundland and
Labrador, Vital Statistics Act, SNL 2009, c V-6.01; Northwest
Territories, Vital Statistics Act, RSNWT 1988, c V-3, ss 1-11; Nova
Scotia, Vital Statistics Act, RSNS 1989, c 494; Ontario, Vital
Statistics Act, RSO 1990, c V.4, ss 8-17; Prince Edward Island, Vital
Statistics Act, RSPEI 1988, c V-4.1; Saskatchewan, Vital Statistics
Act, SS 2009, c V-7.21; Yukon, Vital Statistics Act, RSY 2002, c 225,
ss 1-15. Social service agencies are increasingly concerned with the
identification of the father in order to ensure his consent and a smooth
adoption process; questioning of the mother, therefore, may be
invasive. In some American states, this potential arises because “the
state’s use of ‘due diligence’ to locate the putative father may result
in a violation of the unwed mother’s privacy by breaking the
confidential communication the woman shares with the state agent or
the court:” Cecily Helms & Phyllis Spence, “Take Notice Unwed
Fathers: An Unwed Mother’s Right to Privacy in Adoption
Proceedings” (2005) 20 Wis Women’s LJ 1 at 13. Some provinces
have adopted birth father or paternity registries that automatically
entitle a registered father to notice if the mother seeks third party
adoption. For example, British Columbia employs a birth father
registry. Notice of proceedings, however, does not automatically
translate into a requirement that a father consent to adoption. This is
governed under the Adoption Act. The act requires some level of
involvement from a father before his consent will be required, but is
subject to significant judicial discretion: Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c
5, s 1, Part 2 – The Process Leading to Adoption. As this article will
illustrate, however, even careful wording of adoption statutes does
not preclude interference by an uninvolved unwed father who claims
discrimination under the Charter. In Saskatchewan, the Children’s
Law Act provides that “where the parents have never cohabited after
the birth of the child, the parent with whom the child resides is the
sole custodian of the child:” The Children’s Law Act, SS 1997, c C8.2, s 3(2). A challenge under section seven of the Charter was
dismissed in 2004: Giles v Beisel, [2006] 2 WWR 724. Nonetheless,
in 2004, the Adoption Amendment Act was passed; exceptions are
available and an ex parte application can be made to dispense with
the requirement to give notice “to address the difficult circumstances
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Whose consent is required to relinquish a child? Must the
mother notify the father when she becomes pregnant or reveal
his name to social service agencies? Should the mother and
father have equal rights to determine the future of a newborn
child? These legal issues have not been definitively resolved.
I argue that the unfettered right to release a newborn
child for third party adoption is an essential component of
women’s reproductive autonomy. It is also essential to
women’s dignity and equality rights, and to the right to liberty
and security of the person. A mother forced to notify a father
might feel, for the sake of the infant, that she has no option but
to discontinue adoption proceedings and retain custody against
the father.6 She should not be forced to retain custody when she
wishes, for personal reasons, to release a child to a third party.
Moreover, a mother afraid of such a scenario might be more
likely to undergo an abortion or reverse the adoption process.
No woman should feel compelled to abort when such action is
“contrary to her beliefs, moral principles, or health concerns.”7
As the only person who has provided care for the child,
the mother’s wishes for the child’s future must be respected.
of conception resulting from rape or incest,” but it seems that
otherwise a mother must tell a father of her pregnancy.
6

These fears/problems are recognized in safe haven legislation in most
American states that allows a mother to abandon a baby, immediately
after birth, without having to reveal her identity or that of the father,
without fearing prosecution. There is, of course, an inconsistency in
allowing abandonment through such channels, but insisting that a
mother who does not so abandon her child must name the father. Safe
haven legislation, however, is believed to prevent unsafe
abandonment and infanticide. See: Susan Ayers, “Kairos and Safe
Havens: The Timing and Calamity of an Unwanted Birth” (2009)
15(2) Wm & Mary J Women & Law 227.

7

Nancy Erickson, “The Feminist Dilemma Over Unwed Parents’
Custody Rights” (1984) 2 Law and Inequality 447 at 455.
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Relinquishing a child for adoption has to be viewed as an act of
love, “as the last in a series of actions meant to provide care for
the child, not as an act of abandonment that gives her no
interest in the child’s placement.”8 The mother who carries a
child to term has made a conscious choice to parent by
continuing her pregnancy. The father has made no parallel
sacrifices.9 Women who find themselves pregnant without
supportive partners, still almost exclusively those who
contemplate third party adoption, face a myriad of difficult
decisions throughout pregnancy. A woman cannot make a fully
informed and free decision to carry a child to term if she must
fear the intervention of an ex-lover in the disposition of the
child post-birth. Based upon an exhaustive study of all extant
reported cases with regard to consent to newborn adoption in
English-Canada,10 I suggest that consent provisions have too
8

Mary Shanley, “Fathers’ Rights, Mothers’ Wrongs?: Reflections on
Unwed Fathers’ Rights and Sex Equality” in Uma Narayan & Julia
Bartkowiak, eds, Having and Raising Children: Unconventional
Families, Hard Choices and the Social Good (Pennsylvania: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999) 39 at 59.

9

It can be argued that [some] men have played a supportive role. The
mother, in my view, may choose to recognize such support by
inviting the father [or some other involved and supportive third party]
into the baby’s life, but she should not be obligated to accept the
involvement of a man who may deem himself supportive but who, to
the mother, may appear controlling and interfering.

10

The sample consists of 284 reported cases dating from 1948 to 2010.
Exhaustive QUICKLAW searches were undertaken. All provinces
and territories are represented except Quebec (although there are
revocation cases extant in that province). Quebec’s history is very
different due to the civil law tradition. Interestingly, Quebec is also
the first province to attempt to grapple with social vs. genetic
parenting claims. See: Robert Leckey, “Where the Parents Are of the
Same Sex: Quebec’s Reforms to Filiation” (2009) 23 Int’l JL Policy
& Fam 62. British Columbia is also now undertaking a complete
revision of parentage legislation. For further information, see: British
Columbia, Ministry of the Attorney-General, Justice Services Branch,
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often disrespected mothers and devalued their gestational labor.
Insult is added to injury when men are accorded rights over
women’s bodies through purely genetic claims. The
relinquishment of the child at birth is a reproductive decision
that should be controlled exclusively by the mother.11 Allowing
men to override the decisions of women reduces mothers to
incubators and violates women’s rights under section 15 and
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(“Charter”).12
Civil Policy and Legislation Office, “White Paper on Family
Relations Act Reform: Proposals for a New Family Law Act”,
(Vancouver: Ministry of the Attorney-General, 2010), online:
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/legislation/pdf/Family-Law-WhitePaper.pd
f>. All provinces are represented, but this article does not engage in
statistical analysis of outcomes, and acknowledges that judicial
discretion allows for significant variation in adoption consent cases.
However, this discretion is itself dangerous for the reasons that
follow. Strong patterns and themes were evident in these cases, as
explained below, and particular cases were selected for extended
analysis because they illustrate the problems that women can face
under this unclear/contradictory legal regime. It is also of note that
reported cases themselves are a limited historical/legal source. As
with other aspects of family law, many cases regarding adoption are
heard in courts which do not routinely report their findings, and
patterns of decision-making ‘on-the-ground’ may not reflect the
values and problems evident in reported cases. For an extended
discussion of the differences between reported and unreported cases,
see: Lori Chambers, Misconceptions: Unmarried Motherhood and the
Ontario Children of Unmarried Parents Act, 1921-1969 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2007). Nonetheless, reported cases are
important because of their ‘educational’ impact on lawyers, judges
and the public.
11

It must be noted here that this argument applies only to newborn
adoption.

12

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11, s 15 and s 7 [Charter].
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To illustrate this argument, consent provisions are
contextualized by explicating the disrespect for unmarried birth
mothers that has been central to adoption regimes. This is
contrasted with the expanding rights of non-marital fathers
under Charter litigation. Part I of this article explores the
passage of adoption legislation and the rights of birth mothers.
The baby was a desirable commodity and the mother was
treated with disdain. Her consent to adoption was often
obtained under conditions of duress. In a trilogy of cases in the
1950s, the Supreme Court of Canada established that mothers
can revoke their consent to adoption, with some qualifications.
In 1970, the fact that she was sometimes subjected to
significant coercion was acknowledged. Although these cases
did not involve the rights of fathers, they are important because
they reveal that adoption is part of a continuum of reproductive
choices over which women need to have sole control.
Moreover, they illustrate that the decision to relinquish a child
for adoption is fraught and painful. In recent years, mothers’
rights, on the erroneous assertion that single mothers no longer
face stigma or social disadvantage, have been restricted. In
contrast, an unwed father, who initially had no rights under
adoption legislation, can attempt to coerce the mother into
abortion, ignore, malign, and harass her, and still assert rights
over the baby at the time of birth.
Part II of the article explores the origins of unwed
fathers’ claims in adoption cases. Traditionally, only married
men had legal custody of children and unmarried men had no
say in relinquishment for adoption. In the 1970s, in a context in
which cohabitation was being recognized as having important
parallels with marriage, unmarried fathers with existing
relationships with older children were determined to have a
veto right over third party adoption. Unwed fathers’ claims
were based on social fatherhood, particularly evidence that
fathers had cohabited with, and supported, their children, not
the genetic connection valorized by current fathers’ rights
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groups. Nonetheless, based on such precedents, more recent
Charter analysis has opened the door for uninvolved and
abusive men to claim an ‘interest’ in their genetic children.
In Part III of this paper, I critique the insertion of
formal equality reasoning into a context that is fundamentally
gendered. With regard to newborn adoption, Charter reasoning
has delivered equality with a vengeance. Although the
examples in the article are based upon the non-marital context,
I argue that all women, whatever their marital status, should
have the sole right to determine the future of their newborn
children. After all, married men can also be abusive,
manipulative, and simply disinterested. The decision to release
a child for adoption is analogous to, and interdependent with,
the right to abortion, and relinquishment should be considered
an issue of reproductive freedom, not a question of custody.
Interference in the birth mother’s decision making process
violates her section 15 right to equality; the on-going poverty
and discrimination faced by single mothers are erased when the
genetic claims of men are considered to give them equal
standing with mothers in adoption cases. Moreover, women’s
section 7 rights to liberty and security of the person are vitiated
when men can interfere with adoption placement, forcing
women to abort or to retain custody themselves.
PART I: THE (LIMITED) RIGHTS OF THE BIRTH
MOTHER
Before the passage of adoption statutes, the unwed mother had
de facto responsibility for her child. But this autonomy was
based on denigration of the mother, not respect for her. She and
her child were outcasts. Under the common law the child born
to an unmarried mother was nullius filius, a child of nobody.
As Blackstone asserted, “the incapacity of a bastard consists
principally in this, that he cannot be heir to any one, neither can
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he have heirs, but of his own body.”13 It was assumed that
women would lie about paternity, and that the father was “too
uncertain a figure for the law to take any cognizance of him.”14
The unwed father, therefore, had no legal connection, or
obligation, to his child(ren): “fatherhood was … awarded to the
man assumed to share a biological connection with the child.
This man … was the mother’s husband.”15 Unmarried mothers
faced myriad difficulties in raising children alone, and it is not
surprising that ‘illegitimate’ infants comprised the
overwhelming majority of those relinquished for adoption.
Also unsurprisingly, once adoption statutes were passed, a
married woman could not relinquish a baby without the consent
of her husband.
Canadian jurisdictions passed adoption statutes
between 1913 and 1952.16 These statutes reflected both an on13

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (London:
Kerr, 1857) at 485.

14

Re M (an infant), [1955] 2 QBD 479 at 488.

15

Fiona Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal Fatherhood in
Maintaining the Traditional Family” (2009) 21(2) CJWL 315 at 316.

16

Alberta, An Act Respecting Infants, (1913), c 13, ss 1-9; British
Columbia, An Act Respecting the Adoption of Children (1935), c 2, ss
1-16; Manitoba, Child Welfare Act, c 35, ss 92-99; New Brunswick,
Adoption Act, (1946), c 57; Newfoundland, Welfare of Children Act
(1952) c 60; Northwest Territories, An Ordinance Respecting the
Adoption of Children, (1967), c 2, ss 1-17; Ontario, Adoption Act
(1921) c 55; Prince Edward Island, Adoption Act (1950) c 2; Quebec,
Loi de l’Adoption, (1925), c 196, s 1; Saskatchewan, Child Welfare
Act, c 278, part 4, ss 76-91. Despite the fact that adoption was not
recognized under common law, informal adoption has a long, prestatutory reform, history: GF Lemby, Family Law (Toronto:
International Self-Counsel Press, 1971) at 157. The status of
informally adopted children, however, was tenuous. For example, in
1909, foster parents in Ontario who had cared for a child for over a
year, without being paid for the child’s upkeep, attempted to keep the
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going denigration of the unwed mother, and the new emphasis
on the child as innocent, a blank slate, dependent and
vulnerable.17 It became morally imperative for the unwed
mother to give up her baby. The founder of the Ontario
Children’s Aid Society, J.J. Kelso, argued that “no unmarried
mother can successfully bring up her child and save it from
disgrace and obloquy. (But) the child, if adopted young by
respectable, childless people, will grow up creditably, and
without any painful reminders of its origins.”18 To remove any
connection with the tainted mother, an adoption order divested
“the natural parent, guardian or person in whose custody the
child has been of all legal rights in respect of such child.”19 The
child became “for the purposes of custody of the person and
child when the parents sought to reclaim her. Although the parents
had signed an agreement with the fostering couple to release the child
for adoption, the court referred to precedent and legal texts and
asserted that “the law of England knows nothing of adoption” and
that “parents cannot enter into an agreement legally binding to
deprive themselves of the custody and control of their children; and,
if they elect to do so, can at any moment resume their control over
them:” Re Davis, [1909] OLR 384 at 386. The married father could
always reclaim his child; no case establishing this right for the unwed
mother, however, is extant in the Canadian context. Customary
adoption, practiced by Indigenous peoples, was and remains, also, a
form of informal adoption, and one which has had only tenuous legal
recognition. For further information, see Cindy Baldassi, “The Legal
Status of Customary Adoption Across Canada: Comparisons,
Contrasts and Convergences” (2006) 39 UBC L Rev 63.
17

See: Chambers, supra note 10; and Patricia Holland, Picturing
Childhood: The Myth of the Child in Popular Imagery (London: IB
Taurus, 2004).

18

As quoted in Andrew Jones and Leonard Rutman, In the Children’s
Aid: J.J. Kelso and Child Welfare in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1981) at 156.

19

This paragraph summarizes the provisions of the Ontario Adoption
Act, RSO 1921, c 55, s 10(1)(a)-(c), 11(2).
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rights of obedience, to all intents and purposes the child of the
adopting parents.”20 The adoption process was shrouded in
secrecy; the natural parent was symbolically erased from the
child’s life and all original birth records were sealed. Adoption
statutes introduced into law the “statutory death of the
biological parents and the rebirth of the adoptee.”21 The
biological father remained a shadowy figure, without rights,
and with limited financial obligations, and these only in (rare)
cases in which women kept their babies and could prove
paternity in court.
Consent for adoption could, and still can, be granted by
the judge, against the will of the parents, if the parents were
deemed unfit, if the parents were imprisoned, or if the child had
been made a crown ward.22 Under some provincial regimes,
unwed mothers could be determined to be unfit based simply
on poverty,23 a condition that was all too common in a world in
20

Adoption Act, RSO 1921, c 55, s 11(1)-(2). Until 1970, however, with
regard to wider kin the child had no legal status. With the passage of
the Child Welfare Act, 1970, this was amended, and adopted children
were made equal with natural born children unless a contrary
intention was expressed in the will of wider kin. This was confirmed
in Re Barthelmes, [1971] 1 OR 752.

21

Katrysha Bracco, “Patriarchy and the Law of Adoption: Beneath the
Best Interests of the Child” (1997) 35(4) Alta L Rev 1035 at 1041.

22

Ontario Adoption Act, RSO 1921, c 55, s 5.

23

In Ontario, companion legislation to adoption statutes explicitly
constructed the unwed mother as unfit. The Children of Unmarried
Parents Act undermined the common law assumption that the mother
was the de facto guardian of her illegitimate child. Instead, it
provided in section 10 that “the provincial officer [the government
employee appointed to enforce these three acts] may upon his own
application be appointed guardian of a child born out of wedlock
either alone or jointly with the mother of such child.” Under child
welfare legislation, the CAS had the right to remove children from
the custody and control of unfit parents and to make such children
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which single mothers were deeply stigmatized and employment
opportunities for all women were limited. Unwed mothers were
put under considerable pressure to release newborns for third
party adoption. Svanhuit Josie, a child welfare worker from
Ottawa, lamented in 1955 that “it seems to me that casework
with the unmarried mother has come to mean the process of
convincing her that it is impossible if not absolutely immoral
for her to plan to keep her own child. She must be made to face
the ‘reality’ of the situation, which means to give it up for
adoption.”24 Her critique, however, prompted a harsh rebuttal
from the supervisor of the Unmarried Parents Department of
the Toronto Children’s Aid Society, who asserted that most
mothers keeping their children “were emotionally sick people”
and that the social worker therefore “trie(d) to be of assistance
in helping her assess the realities of her situation.”25
Adoption statutes made placement with a third party
legal. A central purpose of adoption statutes was to provide
security to adoptive families; a fundamental disrespect for the
‘illegitimate’ mother underlay this legislation. The consent of
the mother was required, but the conditions under which she
gave such consent were not regulated. She faced considerable
social stigma, possible familial pressure, and the prospect of
crown wards and then to release them for adoption without parental
consent to relinquishment. This power was expanded under the
Children of Unmarried Parents Act. Section 11 established that when
“the mother…through lack of means is unable, or through misconduct
is unfit to have the care of the child, the child may, with the consent
of the provincial officer, be dealt with as a ‘neglected child’.” Simply
put, an unwed mother could be deemed unfit purely because of her
poverty: An Act for the Protection of the Children of Unmarried
Parents, SO 1921, c 54, ss 10-11.
24

Svanhuit Josie, “The American Caricature of the Unmarried Mother”
(1955) 29(12) Canadian Welfare 247 at 249.

25

Kathleen Sutherton, “Another View” (1955) 31(5) Canadian Welfare
7.
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poverty. Ostensibly, the child to be adopted was placed in a
probationary home pending formal adoption and the mother
had a right to revoke her consent until adoption was finalized.
In practice, however, it was assumed to be in the best interest
of the child to remain in the adoptive home.26 As one judge
asserted in Ontario in 1948, despite the fact that an adoption
had not been finalized, the child could not be returned to the
mother:
[W]here a parent has signed a solemn consent to
adoption under the provisions of the Adoption
Act and the foster parents have taken the child
and assumed their duties with a view to fulfilling
the probationary requirements of the act, I do not
think that a child is to be restored to the natural
parent on the mere assertion of that parent’s
right. I think the parent must go further and
show that ‘having regard to the welfare of the
child’ it should not be permitted to remain with
the foster parents.27
In the 1950s, a trilogy of Supreme Court cases
established that, until an adoption was finalized, mothers had a
right to revoke consent and have infants returned to them. In
Martin v. Duffell (1950),28 the mother stated her objections to
the adoption promptly, but the adoptive parents and the
adoption agency refused to return the child. It was found that
before the final order of adoption the mother had the right to
reclaim her child unless her behavior had rendered her
inappropriate as a parent.29 In Hepton v. Maat (1957),30 the
26

For an extended discussion of this issue, see: Chambers, supra note
10 at chapter 4.

27

Re Fex, [1948] OWN 497 at 499.

28

[1950] SCR 737 [Martin].

29

Ibid.
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mother and father had initially given up their child because the
husband was unemployed, they were very young, and they
were recent immigrants from Holland with considerable
financial challenges. They quickly regretted the decision and
tried to revoke their consent before the adoption was finalized,
but the adoptive parents contested. The court found that
“natural parents are entitled to custody unless by reason of
some act, condition or circumstance affecting them it is evident
that the welfare of the child requires that the fundamental
natural relationship be severed.”31 In the final case of the
trilogy, Agar v. McNeilly (1958),32 heard in 1958, it was found
that “the mother of an illegitimate child, who is of good
character and is able and willing to support it in satisfactory
surroundings, is entitled to the custody of that child.” The court
also noted that the mother had been quick to revoke her consent
and that the adoptive parents, and the adoption agency, had
gone to great lengths to conceal the location of the child and to
encourage the mother to give up her quest for the baby.33
In Re Mugford (1970),34 the court explicitly
acknowledged the problems that women faced, such as those
hinted at in Agar. The mother sought an order for “production
and delivery of the infant David John Mugford” born to her
out-of-wedlock.35 The child had been placed for adoption, but
the final adoption order had not yet been granted. On learning
that she was pregnant, the mother had moved to live with a
married sister in Ottawa. She consulted the Children’s Aid
30

[1957] SCR 606.

31

Ibid at 607.

32

[1958] SCR 52 at para 10 [Agar]. The court is referring to its decision
in Martin.

33

Ibid at para 10, referring to Martin.

34

[1970] 1 OR 601 [Re Mugford].

35

Ibid at para 1.
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Society with regard to the future of her child and two social
workers affirmed that the mother had been “tense and upset,”
“depressed … without much self-defense or self-assurance,”
and “in a state of indecision as to what should be done about
the child since she would have no way of keeping it.”36 She
was 19 years-old and her parents did not know that she was
pregnant. She signed the adoption papers, but shortly thereafter
was so distressed by her actions that she informed her parents
of her predicament and sought their help in regaining custody
of her child. The child had been placed in an adoptive home for
only a few weeks, but the Children’s Aid Society informed the
mother that:
David has adjusted well to his new environment
and we cannot disturb this arrangement.
However, you can feel assured that he is
receiving plenty of loving care, and he will be
given every opportunity to grow into a healthy
and happy adult … I hope you will be able to
adjust and make a new life for yourself.37
The court of first instance determined that there was
“no evidence on the record which suggests that the respondent
mother had deserted or abandoned [the] child.”38 Instead, it
held that “she was motivated solely by a sincere desire to do
what she thought was then in the best interests of her child
despite an almost overpowering desire on her part to keep him
and be a mother to him.”39 This case illustrates the social
pressures that might encourage a woman to relinquish her child
for adoption and the difficulty with which these decisions are
36
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37
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38
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39
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made. The fact that the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the
decision represents the high water mark of the Supreme Court’s
recognition of the rights of mothers.40
Despite these edicts from the Supreme Court, however,
evidence from lower court decisions suggests that pressures
within the CAS regarding adoption continued. Young women
asserted that “counseling … was directed only towards
adoption and did not adequately point out the alternatives”41
and consisted of “a rough estimate of the welfare payments she
would receive if she kept the baby, and having decided that this
sum would provide no real life or future for her child, adoption
was ‘sold’ to her as the only alternative.”42 Social workers
continued to tell women that they could not revoke consent,
and refused to return babies even when such children “had only
been placed in another home for a fortnight or so and when no
application for adoption had been instituted.”43
In response to the trilogy, Re Mugford, and the
resistance of social workers, provinces revised their adoption
40
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41

Infant Registration No 74-09-001156 (Re), [1974] BCJ No 438 at
para 6. In this instance, however, the court rejected her evidence on
the basis that she was “too intelligent” not to have understood what
she was doing.

42

JSB (Re), [1972] BCJ No 275 at para 5. In this case, the judge
acknowledged such pressures and the baby was returned to the
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expressed his commitment to the child. They were exhorted to
“legitimize this relationship without delay, even if this denies them
the ‘nice’ wedding both hope to have:” at para 18.
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which the mother initially revoked her consent.

356

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 26, 2010]

statutes, introducing provisions that made it clear that
revocation was possible only within a short period of time
immediately after birth; after such time, if the mother changed
her mind, proceedings in court would be required. For
example, Ontario established a 21-day window for withdrawal
of consent.44 An Ontario county court, interpreting the new
provision, asserted that its purpose was to prevent “capricious
and arbitrary evasion of a consent … the inquiry by the Court
is not to be hampered by the regrets and changing whims of the
natural parents.”45 The effect of these provisions was that after
the short revocation period the mother “and the proposed
adoptive parents [were] on an equal basis … That being so the
paramount consideration is the welfare of the child.”46 In the
1980s, the Supreme Court of Canada was called upon to
interpret these revisions with regard to revocation; the
assumption underlying their decisions in these cases seems to
be that women who relinquish their babies are simply bad
44
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mothers, not women who face difficult circumstances and who
relinquish their children as an act of love.
In a new trilogy of cases, the rights of relinquishing
mothers were severely circumscribed. In the first case,
Manitoba (Director of Child Welfare) v. Y (1981),47 a 19-yearold Manitoba mother had released her child for adoption
immediately after the seven-day waiting period, required under
legislation, had elapsed. Two days later, she attempted to
revoke her consent, but was told that the baby had been placed
for adoption. Under provincial legislation, the mother could
revoke her consent within the child’s first year of life or until
the baby was placed in a probationary adoptive home,
whichever came first.48 The court of first instance, therefore,
found no strict violation of her rights. On appeal, Monnin J.A.
found that “in effect, what the Director did by his speedy action
was to deprive this young mother of all her rights…The
legislature, having made provision for the withdrawal of a
voluntary surrender, expected this right to be of some effect,
and capable of being made use of.”49 The Supreme Court,
however, disagreed and reversed the decision. The legislation
did not restrict the right to place the child immediately after the
signing of consent, and no rights had been violated. The
woman, especially since she had already relinquished an earlier
child for adoption, understood the impact of the consent form.50
The second revocation case was heard in 1983. Although the
mother in Racine v. Woods (1983)51 was not found to have
abandoned her child, her claim was denied. This case was
complicated by the fact that a particularly long period of time
47
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48
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had passed during which the child had been in the undisrupted
custody of the adoptive parents. The preference for the
biological parent was held to be of less importance than the
best interest of the child, which the court deemed would be
served by leaving the child with the parents with whom the
child had bonded: “this does not mean, of course, that the
child’s tie with its natural parent is irrelevant in the making of
an order under the section … But it is the parental tie as a
meaningful and positive force in the life of the child and not in
the life of the parent that the court has to be concerned
about.”52 King v. Low (1985)53 confirmed these limitations on
52

Ibid at 185. It should also be noted that this case was complicated by
issues of race as the mother was Aboriginal and the adoptive family
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critique: see ibid at 187-188. While the concerns about respect for
Aboriginality might have greater weight given statutory reform since
1983, Racine has yet to be overturned by the Supreme Court. See,
Tae Mee Park, “In the Best Interests of the Aboriginal Child” (2003)
16 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 43 at 43; Patricia Monture, “A
Vicious Circle: Child Welfare and the First Nations” (1989) 3 CJWL
1; and Gillian Calder, “‘Finally, I Know Where I Am Going to be
From’: Culture, Context and Time in a Look Back at Racine v.
Woods” in Kim Brooks, ed, Justice Bertha Wilson: One Woman’s
Difference (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010)
173. It is also important to note that the Supreme Court rejected the
possibility, raised by the courts in Manitoba, of an open adoption in
which the mother might apply for access. The court, in adoption
cases, seems to see openness as a threat to the stability of the adoptive
family. However, in divorce access cases, it is not seen as disruptive,
but as necessary for the well-being of the child. For further
information on divorce, access and the requirement that the mother
facilitate visits by the father, see: Susan Boyd, “Backlash and the
Construction of Legal Knowledge: The Case of Child Custody Law”
(2001) 20 Windsor YB Access Just 141; Linda Neilson, “Putting
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the rights of the natural mother. The mother had chosen private
adoption in the hope that she might have some contact with the
child as he grew up and released her child only because of fear
of the disapproval of her family. The child left the hospital with
the adoptive parents five days after his birth and resided with
them thereafter without disruption. The mother immediately
regretted her decision, discussed the situation with her mother
and requested the return of her child, but the adoptive parents
refused. The trial judge held that the mother had neither
abandoned her child nor conducted herself in a manner that
meant the court should refuse to enforce her rights as a
guardian, but nonetheless concluded that the child should
remain with the adoptive parents.54 The Supreme Court
concurred and dismissed the mother’s appeal.55
In a recent case, an Ontario divisional court asserted
that “the existence of a valid consent by a parent to an adoption
is … fundamental to the integrity of the entire adoption process
… Thus if it can be proven that a consent to adoption is
obtained through undue influence or coercion, it can be argued
that the adoption proceedings based on that consent must be
nullified.”56 A 17-year-old mother claimed that she had been
subjected to undue influence and that she had verbally
contacted the Children’s Aid Society during the requisite
period to revoke her consent. Legislation, however, requires
Revisions to the Divorce Act Through a Family Violence Research
Filter: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly” (2003) 20 Can J Fam L 11;
Wanda Wiegers & Michaela Keet, “Collaborative Family Law and
Gender Inequalities: Balancing Risks and Opportunities” (2008) 46
Osgoode Hall LJ 733; and Alison Harvison Young, “Joint Custody
As Norm: Solomon Revisited” (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall LJ 785.
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that this revocation be made in writing, which she failed to do,
and the Children’s Aid Society, in the absence of written
revocation, did not respect her wishes. The court, however,
rejected her coercion claim and explicitly distinguished a
situation in which a “parent has changed her mind or regrets a
decision made under the influence of family members or
cultural pressures.”57
Clearly, this reflects an impoverished understanding of
the challenges which unwed mothers, particularly young
unwed mothers, still confront. Mothers face potential poverty
and stigma, pressure from families, and may also face pressure
from the bureaucracies that are ostensibly charged with helping
women. While the security of the placement of the child is a
legitimate concern, mothers have a legal right to reclaim
children early in the adoption process and this right should be
respected within the legislatively established time frame. These
cases do not directly engage the question of whether or not the
mother should have sole decision-making power with regard to
relinquishment for adoption and concern the right to change
one’s mind about adoption, not the right to relinquish without
interference. Nonetheless, they are important. Courts often
“subordinate the importance of blood ties to the stability of the
existing home setting”58 when they assert that children should
stay in adoptive homes, despite the wishes of mothers. It is
ironic that precisely when the pressures to which women are
subjected were being denied recognition, the rights of unwed
fathers were being expanded and their ‘blood ties’ to children
were being increasingly valorized.

57
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PART II: THE RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS
Historically, unwed fathers had no rights or obligations to their
children. In 1973, however, a father, who had cohabited with
his child, asserted that he should be able to veto the unilateral
decision of the mother to release the child for adoption. His
position was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada. The
father in Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v.
Lyttle (1973)59 had lived with the mother of the child until the
child was two years old, at which time the mother left to live
with another man, taking the child with her.60 Without
informing the father, she placed the child with the Children’s
Aid Society for adoption. The father did not learn of the
situation until the time period for contesting the wardship order
had elapsed, but before the adoption order was finalized. He
argued that the wardship order was void on procedural grounds
as he had not been informed; without a wardship order, the
adoption could not proceed. The court upheld his claim.61
In R. v. Gingell (1976),62 the Supreme Court held that
“prima facie, the word ‘parent’ when used in a statute should
be given its ordinary meaning unless, in the context of the
statute, a restricted meaning should be given” reversing the
general presumption that illegitimate children could be
excluded categorically under principles of statutory
interpretation. In this case the father had lived with his
59

[1973] SCR 568 [Lyttle].

60

Technically the mother was within her rights under legislation. In
1929, consent provisions within adoption had been amended such that
the consent of a father was required if the child resided with, and was
maintained by, the father at the time of the application: The Statute
Law Amendment Act, SO (1929), c 23, s 11. However, Lyttle did not
live with or support his child at the time of the surrender to the CAS.

61

Supra note 59.

62

[1976] 2 SCR 86.

362

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 26, 2010]

children, but the mother left him, taking the children with her.
She thereafter abandoned them to the Children’s Aid Society
and they became crown wards without his knowledge or
consent. The children were returned to his custody.63
While historically the unwed father was constructed as
“too uncertain a figure for the law to take any cognizance of
him,”64 by the 1970s courts recognized the parental efforts of
cohabiting non-marital fathers. When men have established and
positive relationships with their children, such an interpretation
of marriage as irrelevant is entirely reasonable. But it is
important to note that decisions were premised, not on the
genetic connection itself, but on evidence that fathers had acted
as social parents to their children. As McClung J. held in a case
involving former cohabitation, “the narrow issue in this appeal
and that upon which the rights of H.J.L. must be resolved is the
omission of notice to him, an interested father. Full disclosure
of his real presence was not made to the learned chambers
judge.” He made it clear, however, that he “[did] not wish to be
taken as deciding that notice to biological fathers must be given
in all proposed adoptions.”65
In 1975, an Ontario divisional court directly considered
the question of whether or not a mother was obligated to name
the father of her child when she relinquished a newborn baby
for adoption. The court explicitly distinguished newborn
adoption from circumstances such as those in Lyttle. The court
asserted that newborn adoption “discloses an entirely different
statement of facts. In the Lyttle case, the father not only wanted
custody of his son, but also in the registration of the birth,
acknowledged his paternity. The proceedings taken by the
Children’s Aid Society were taken behind his back, although
63
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the registration, if examined, would have disclosed his
relationship and name.” The mother of a newborn, in contrast,
would not be forced to disclose the name of the father of her
child.66
In 1979, four Ontario wardship orders were challenged
to determine the obligations of the Children’s Aid Society in
investigating paternity and naming fathers in adoption cases.
The family court in York County held that a father of children
born out of wedlock is entitled to notice and consent in
adoption proceedings. The court had to consider the fact that
distinctions between married and unmarried parents had been
abolished. Rights of notice for the father were vigorously
opposed by counsel for the Children’s Aid Society who argued
that giving unfettered rights to all genetic fathers would lead to
violent men and sperm donors being able to interfere in
adoption proceedings and would thwart the purpose of
legislation by reducing rates of relinquishment. However, the
court found that these concerns could be met as the Children’s
Aid Society had the right to exclude specific fathers after
investigating the circumstances surrounding each birth and
potential adoption.67 All four applications were sent back for
consent from fathers.68
Charter-based equality rights were first raised in the
context of the adoption of non-marital children in 1986. In this
case, a father petitioned for an order restraining the placement
of his daughter for adoption. He had never been married to the
child’s mother, but had lived with her before and after the birth
66
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of the child. He argued that the requirement that only the
mother consent to adoption in cases not involving marriage
discriminated against him on the basis of sex and marital status
and thereby violated the equality provisions of the Charter.
The petition was granted. The court found that adoption
provisions create statutory distinctions between fathers and
mothers that contradict changing social conditions and the
elimination of illegitimacy at law.69 While in this case the
outcome was a reasonable reflection of the father’s
involvement in the child’s life, by endorsing the father’s
Charter arguments that he was discriminated against on the
basis of his status as an unwed father, instead of focusing on
indices of social fatherhood, the case opened the door for
purely genetic claims by uninvolved non-marital fathers.70
In extensive proceedings in 1987 and 1988, an Ontario
family court (York) and then a divisional court again
considered the claim that biological fathers were discriminated
against by not being notified with regard to the adoption of
infants born out of wedlock. The case originated with a
procedure for finalization of adoption. The baby was born of a
casual relationship where the mother had not notified the
father, but Nevins J. returned the adoption, “adjourned the
proceedings, directed that the Attorneys-General of Ontario
and Canada be advised that he had raised a constitutional issue
as to the validity of s. 131(1) of the Act … [and] arranged for
the appointment of counsel to represent the class of biological
fathers who might be affected by the constitutional issue.”71
69
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Counsel representing the interests of genetic fathers argued that
“the mother and the father (married or not) are necessary to
conceive the child” and that “the fact of whether or not the
parents are married has no effect on the child; and both are
presumed to be able and entitled to care for the child.”72
Counsel for the Attorney-General asserted that “the purpose of
the legislation in this regard is to achieve an expeditious
adoption”73 and that “by the fact of birth the mother has at least
some minimal involvement with the care of the child, while the
fathers, married or not, have no similar involvement.”74 They
also submitted that “parental rights of a biological father do not
exist ‘in a vacuum’ equal to those of the mother, but rather are
rights which arise, or are ‘activated’ by some positive conduct
being taken by the father.”75 It was asserted that, because the
Children’s Aid Society was obligated to investigate the
circumstances surrounding pregnancy and obtain consent from
involved fathers, the only father who would be excluded “is a
male person who by an act of casual sexual intercourse
impregnates a woman and shows no sense of responsibility for
the natural consequences of the act of sexual intercourse.”76
The divisional court acknowledged that mother and father, in
such cases, are not “similarly situated. The mother because of
physical necessity has shown responsibility to the child … It is
thus apparent that the different statutory treatment of the two
persons is based on their respective demonstrated responsibility
to the child, not upon their different sexes.”77 The adoption was
allowed to proceed.
72
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In a 1992 Nova Scotia case,78 counsel for an unwed
and uninvolved father asserted that “the provision of the Act
which permits an adoption of a child to take place without the
consent of the father who does not come within the definition
of ‘parent’ contained in the Act, amounts to a violation of the
equality rights,” and thus should be struck down as
unconstitutional.79 The applicant’s counsel argued that the
applicant was discriminated against in that his consent was not
required because he was male and unmarried. The Children’s
Aid Society contended that “males do not form a discrete or
insular minority that has been stereotyped or subject to
historical disadvantage or vulnerability. Furthermore, the fact
that the law treats men differently than women based on
‘biological reality’ does not constitute discrimination. Thus, the
applicant has not suffered discrimination based on sex.”80 The
court, however, disagreed and concluded that “the Legislature
did not deliberately set out to deprive a child born out of
wedlock of the possible benefit of the fostering and
maintaining of a relationship with his or her father” and that
parens patriae jurisdiction could be exercised to hear the
father’s claim for custody.81
In contrast, in 1994, the British Columbia Supreme
Court held that the mother was the sole guardian of the baby
immediately after birth and that she, therefore, had the legal
78
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right to place her child for adoption without the consent of the
baby’s father.82 This case provides graphic evidence of why
some women fear revealing their pregnancies to men with
whom they have been involved. The mother explicitly
supported the claim of the adoptive parents and asserted that
she would take custody herself rather than see the father
succeed in his claim.83 The genetic father had a history of
abusive behavior: “Mr. Z. spat in her face, pulled her hair, and
called her a slut.”84 She sought refuge in a women’s shelter and
charged him with assault. He was released on a promise not to
see her, but breached this agreement and was arrested several
times.85 They reconciled, but “he became abusive and
threatening” when he learned of her pregnancy: “he swore at
her; left numerous harassing telephone messages on her
answering machine; came by her apartment and banged on her
door and shouted and drove by her building honking his
horn.”86 When he threatened her with a knife at her abdomen,
she “decided to leave Winnipeg, have her baby and place it for
adoption.”87 She travelled to British Columbia, found an
adoption agency and asked that information be withheld from
the father because she considered him to be “a danger to her
and her child.”88 She made a false formal declaration that the
father of the child was unknown “because she thought it would
help to keep [the baby] safe.”89 The adoptive parents were
deemed ‘stable’, although not wealthy, and the adoptive father
82
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had been an adopted child and wanted an open adoption. The
couple had been hand selected by the birth mother.90 Her
choices clearly reflected her concern and love for the child. Mr.
Z “advance[d] his claim to custody on the grounds of the blood
relationship between himself and the baby.”91 The mother
asserted that his “abusive and violent nature makes him an
unfit parent, and that the attitudes he has displayed towards her
and toward women in general are of particular concern given
that this child is a girl.”92 The custody of the adoptive parents
was upheld.93 It was also noted that “since baby I. will know
who her father is, she can choose, at the appropriate time,
whether to initiate contact with him.”94
In contrast, in a 1998 case, the Manitoba Court of
Queen’s Bench, family division, expressed distress that the
birth mother “would not disclose the birth father's name
because ‘she felt he may not have co-operated in adoption
planning’.”95 This leaves open the question of whether his
anticipated lack of co-operation resulted from an expectation
that he would want to raise the child himself.” 96 They did not
inquire as to why the mother might not want her child to be
raised by the father. Concern was expressed that, even with the
anticipated creation of a birth father registry, “if the fact of the
birth of a child has been hidden from the birth father, then he is
not in a position to take advantage of the registry, so his new

90

Ibid at paras 29, 35.

91

Ibid at para 64.

92

Ibid at para 68.

93

Ibid at para 97.

94

Ibid at para 97.

95

RA (Re), [1998] MJ No 348.

96

Ibid at para 6.

Newborn Adoption

369

rights are completely illusory,”97 and the court asserted their
right to exercise parens patrie jurisdiction to fill a legislative
gap.98 The court mistakenly assumed that fathers and mothers
are equally involved in child-rearing: “parents are much more
equal partners in relation to their children than in the past.”99
The court castigated the mother for denying the father “the
right to know that he has a child … If this adoption is granted,
the legal relationship between father and son will be forever
terminated without any notice … That this father and this son
are being treated this way is positively draconian. That the
mother would act this way is unfortunate. That two agencies of
the government would assist her in so doing is completely
unacceptable.”100 Despite the child having been placed for two
years with an adoptive family, the court ordered the agency to
search for the father.
In a 2000 decision of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, a lower court decision to award custody to a genetic
father was overturned. The mother had told the father of the
pregnancy, and he had wanted to marry her, or live together,
and raise the child together. She did not have faith in the
relationship, and ceased contact with the father and released the
child for adoption without giving the father’s name to the
adoption agency. When he learned of the adoption placement
(four months after the birth), the father placed his name on the
provincial birth fathers’ registry and commenced proceedings
for custody.101 By doing so within the 150 day limit imposed
by legislation, the father put himself within the definition of a
‘father’ whose consent was required for the adoption. The
97

Ibid at para 36.

98

Ibid at para 44.

99

Ibid at para 47.

100

Ibid at para 49.

101

British Columbia Birth Registration 99-00733, 2000 BCCA 109.

370

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 26, 2010]

mother regretted her decision and “although she had consented
to the adoption and had not taken any steps to revoke her
consent, at trial she supported the father's position, and sought
an order for joint custody and access.”102 At the court of first
instance, the father was granted interim custody, the adoption
was denied, and the mother was awarded reasonable access.
The appeal of the adoptive parents, however, was dealt with
immediately to avoid further disruption or uncertainty for the
child and the original decision was overturned. Rowles J.A., in
dissent, would have dismissed the appellants’ emphasis “on the
birth father's not having taken active steps to pursue the
question of his parenthood and his opposition to the adoption
of the child between the time he first learned that the birth
mother was pregnant and the date on which he became
registered in the birth fathers' registry … [and their contention]
that he did not have the best interests of the child in mind.”103
Reviewing the history of legislation with regard to adoption,
Rowles J.A. asserted that the provisions of the Adoption Act
had to be interpreted in the context of the Charter, and based
on an understanding that “the unequal treatment accorded
natural fathers evolved from tradition and social custom rather
than a demonstrated unwillingness or inability to parent.”104
Prowse J.A., however, placed much more emphasis on the care
to be provided to the child. The adoptive parents had bonded
with the baby for 10 months, had an open adoptive agreement
with the mother, and were stable and economically
comfortable. The father proposed to have his mother, and a
variety of other caregivers, provide care for the child. Prowse
J.A. asserted that “based on the uncertainties associated with
the care of the child in the birth father's home, I conclude that
the trial judge erred in finding that the factors relating to the
child's best interests were relatively equal as between the two
102

Ibid at para 16.

103

Ibid at para 51.

104

Ibid at para 62.

Newborn Adoption

371

families. Apart from the biological factor, the balance was
clearly in favour of the adoptive parents. That being so … the
biological factor assumed overriding significance,” a
significance with which she disagreed.105 The court set aside
the order, dismissed the application of the birth father and
made an order of adoption. As the disparate outcomes in these
cases illustrate, there has been little consistency or
predictability in Canadian law with regard to the rights of
unwed fathers in newborn adoption cases, and much room for
judicial discretion. This may, however, be about to change.
An emphasis on the rights of biological fathers has
been entrenched in Canadian law in Trociuk v. British
Columbia (Attorney General) (“Trociuk”),106 the leading
naming case in Canada, which further jeopardizes the rights of
gestational mothers who seek to relinquish children for
adoption. In Trociuk, the Court found that “differential
treatment of [unwed] mothers and fathers [in birth registration
and naming] … withholds a benefit from fathers in a manner
which has the effect of signaling to them and to society as a
whole that fathers are less capable or less worthy of recognition
or value than mothers.”107 The decision relied on a formal
equality analysis that de-contextualized the positions of an
unwed (and largely uninvolved) father and a custodial mother
and entrenched the patriarchal norm in Canadian naming
law.108 The Trociuk court failed to recognize that distinctions
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between mothers and fathers at the time of birth are based, not
on stereotypes that mothers are superior nurturers, but on the
realities of pregnancy. Rejecting stereotypes that portray
women as innately nurturing, and corresponding beliefs that
fathers are incapable of positive parenting, “does not require
that we also reject any meaningful differences between
biological motherhood and biological fatherhood.”109 The ratio
in Trociuk, however, suggests that such differences are now to
be denied in the name of ‘equality’; such de-contextualized
analysis reduces women to the status of incubators and has
disturbing consequences for mothers who wish to release their
newborns for adoption.
The impact of Trociuk was immediately apparent in
adoption cases. In 2003, prospective adoptive parents brought a
motion before the Ontario Court of Justice that only the mother
is a parent who must consent to adoption.110 The circumstances
of this case reveal the potential for a father to harass and abuse
a woman he knows to be pregnant. The father was told of the
pregnancy, but responded with anger, not support. He denied
responsibility, bad-mouthed the mother, and shut her out of his
life. His family ordered the mother to stay away from their
house. She then decided to place the child for adoption. After
the birth, and after giving a medical history for adoption, the
father asserted that he and his parents wanted to raise the baby.
The mother told him to seek his rights through the Children’s
Aid Society, which he failed to do within the prescribed time
frame.111 The mother had not cohabited with the father, did not
Naming Practices and the Law in Canada” (2010) 43(1) UBC L Rev
1.
109

Jennifer Hendricks, “Essentially a Mother: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents’ Rights” (2007) 13 Wm & Mary J Women &
L 429 at 468.

110

DGC v RHGY, [2003] 65 OR (3d) 563 at para 2.

111

Ibid at para 3.

Newborn Adoption

373

name him on the birth certificate, and he had not claimed
paternity. She therefore asserted that he did not have standing
as a parent to challenge her decision.112 Although the Adoption
Act clearly delineates and limits the circumstances in which a
biological father will be deemed to have rights with regard to
adoption, requiring him to have some involvement in the
pregnancy and/or child’s life,113 and despite the failure of this
father to seek such rights, the definition of ‘father’ was held to
be discriminatory.
The court determined that it “must consider whether
the decision in Trociuk v. Attorney General for British
Columbia has any bearing on this court’s decision whether to
declare the mother to be the only parent as defined in the
legislation or whether this court should find that the biological
father should be notified.”114 The court found that the father “is
in fact the biological father of the child”115 and because Trociuk
required a mechanism to allow the father to appear on the birth
registration, it followed that “the failure to notify the biological
father of this proceeding and the failure to give him an
112
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opportunity to respond to a motion to dispense with his
consent, on the basis that he is statutorily excluded as a
biological parent, similarly violates his rights under subsection
15(1) of the Charter.”116 The adoption agency was ordered to
obtain the father’s consent. If they could not do so, a hearing
would be held to determine whether his consent could be
dispensed with. If his consent was found to be required, the
wardship order would be set aside and he could claim
custody.117
This decision is clearly problematic. The father
harassed and failed to support the mother. She chose adoption
on the assumption that he could not interfere. Her consent, in a
context in which such interference was subsequently allowed,
was not free. She might well have chosen either abortion or
custody herself had she been able to predict the outcome of
these court proceedings. He had also failed to take any positive
steps to assert his paternity by the means available to him at
law, despite knowing about the birth of the baby and the
impending adoption. While the uninvolved, harassing father
could contest custody on the basis of his ‘equality’ rights, her
consent was considered irrevocable. As commentators in the
United States have noted, it is intensely unfair that a father can
misbehave throughout the pregnancy, including denying
paternity to friends and family, and that these facts “have no
legal impact on his opportunity for fatherhood, symbolic or
otherwise.”118 The mother is given no such second chances,
despite her much greater investment in the child and her
demonstrated concern for the child’s best interest. Her consent
is final, even in the changed circumstances involving
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interference by a man she considers a threat to the well-being
of her child.
In 2006, the ‘Saskatchewan Dad case’ “became a cause
célèbre for the fathers’ rights movement in Canada.”119 The
‘Dad’, identified as Adam Hendricks for the purpose of
litigation, contested adoption on the sole basis of his genetic
connection to his child. He was relentless in his use of the
media to promote his cause.120 As Wanda Wiegers asserts,
“newspaper accounts [of the case] constructed fatherhood
exclusively in genetic terms”121 and rarely considered the rights
of the birth mother or the abusive behavior of the father.
Wiegers calls attention to the fact that “underlying much of the
press coverage of the Saskatoon Dad case [is the assumption]
that birth mothers have a moral duty to disclose their
pregnancies to birth fathers.”122 This assumption must be
contested.
The facts of the case were straightforward. The mother
had recently terminated a relationship with the genetic father at
the time at which she became pregnant. However, “she did not
consider him the father as he had always declared he was
119
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unable to have children as a result of a 1977 industrial accident.
Further complicating the picture was the fact that she had been
intimate with other men at the relevant time.”123 The
relationship between the parties had ended as the result of a
“violent incident” and the mother “complained that Adam was
controlling, insecure and generally neither emotionally nor
mentally healthy.”124 Hendricks, who initially denied the
violence, later admitted to such actions but blamed “his
problematic relationship with Rose for prompting him to drink
on the evening in question, all of which resulted in him striking
Rose.”125 Neither the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench,
family division, nor the press commented that such victimblaming behavior is indicative of an abusive personality and
would justify the mother in choosing not to inform the father
with regard to her pregnancy.126
The mother, identified in court proceedings as Rose
Swan, had a history of substance abuse and limited financial
resources and she knew, as the court put it, that “she was not in
a position to provide her baby with a healthy, nurturing
home.”127 Smith J. described her as “self-aware of her own
failings” instead of evincing any contextualized understanding
of the problems she faced as an Aboriginal woman in a society
rife with colonialism.128 She wanted her child to be raised in an
123
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environment that would honor her heritage. She wanted an
open adoption so that she could have some contact with, and
knowledge about, her child. With the help of her sister, who
worked in a First Nations service agency, she hand selected an
adoptive couple to parent her son. The social parents and Rose
chose the child’s name together and showed all signs of
cooperation and voluntariness.129 The mother endured a
complicated and life-threatening pregnancy and gave the baby
to the adoptive couple directly from the hospital. She exercised
care and concern in her decisions for her child; nonetheless, her
perspective, experiences, and concerns were effectively erased
in legal reasoning and newspaper commentary.130
After learning about the pregnancy and adoption
placement, Hendricks acted immediately to assert his parental
rights. He sought information from social service agencies, but
“made little progress with the authorities. Perhaps this is not
surprising as Adam presented as someone who was
unacknowledged by the birth mother, nor did he have a current
relationship with her. To the authorities, he was simply a male
voice on the phone asserting paternity.”131 Once he had
succeeded in locating the child, he initiated formal proceedings
to establish his paternity and the court, having before it
evidence that he was the genetic father, considered the relative
parenting abilities of the genetic father and the adoptive
parents. The court found that “Adam’s personal life may be
129
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characterized as one of serial monogamy (more or less) with no
commitment extending beyond three years. All the
relationships have uneasy aspects, several of them deeply
troubled.”132 His “experience with employment ha[d] also been
somewhat eclectic”133 and had culminated in personal
bankruptcy. He was described as “emotionally fragile.”134 The
Turners, in contrast, were deemed to be financially and
emotionally stable and committed to parenting.135 Ultimately, it
was determined that the best interests of the child would be met
by custody remaining with the adoptive parents.
The terms of the decision, however, explicitly
constructed the birth mother as a non-parent and erased the
care and concern that had motivated her choice to release the
child for adoption and her selection of the Turners as parents.
In justifying denying Hendricks custody, Smith J. quoted the
Supreme Court in King v. Low and asserted that “parental
claims must not be lightly set aside and they are entitled to
serious consideration in reaching any conclusion. Where it is
clear that the welfare of the child requires it, however, they
must be set aside.”136 But this is not a case in which “parental
claims” were being “set aside.” The mother’s parental claim,
although rendered invisible in the terms of the decision, is what
should be viewed as being honored. It is only by constructing
the mother’s actions as abandonment that she can be viewed as
a non-parent. Smith J. also quoted Abella J.A. in determining
that custody must be determined from the perspective of the
child: “it is a mistake to look down at the child as a prize to be
distributed, rather than from the child up to the parent as an
132
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adult to be accountable.”137 This conveniently renders invisible
the fact that considering the father at all is simply looking at
this from the perspective of paternal ownership. The genetic
father had no relationship with the child to be upheld. This case
would undoubtedly have been appealed by Hendricks had he
not been killed “in a [tragic] motor vehicle accident in August
2007.”138 Given the ratio in Trociuk, the outcome of such an
appeal would have been far from certain; Hendricks also
suggests that it is inevitable that a newborn adoption case will
eventually reach the Supreme Court.
A 2009 case, heard in the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice, illustrates the more mundane dilemmas that pregnant
women face even when genetic fathers are not violent. The
mother hid the birth from the father and then claimed that he
was not the father. His application was allowed in part because
he had been deceived. The mother was determined to have
given up her rights, but a hearing was to be held to determine
custody/access as between the father and the adoptive
parents.139 Although fathers’ rights groups would probably
portray this case as a straight forward example of a man
‘thwarted’ by a dishonest mother, the underlying facts of the
case are much more complicated.
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The father had been informed of the pregnancy. The
parents had agreed upon an abortion, but the mother decided
that she could not follow through with this decision. The father
knew that she had not aborted, but did not show interest in her
pregnancy or provide her with support, neither financial nor
emotional. Because she also did not feel ready to be a parent
(she was a university student at the time at which she became
pregnant), and because the father had not been supportive, she
told him that the child had been stillborn when in fact the child
had been released for adoption.140 She was also unsure about
paternity because she had been sexually assaulted at the time of
the pregnancy, a fact that she had not disclosed to the father.
The father learned through a third party (the maternal
grandmother) that the child had been adopted. The mother then
revealed to the father that she had been sexually assaulted at
the time of conception and that she was not sure about
paternity.141 Adoption proceedings were underway, with the
child in a probationary placement, when the father filed his
acknowledgement of paternity.142
The Court found that “the essence of the father’s case
is established, namely that she did deceive him by telling him
the child was stillborn and in this way prevented him from
asserting his paternity,” but did not contextualize the fact that
the father had been adamant that the mother should abort. The
court admitted that the father did not fall within the strict
definition of a father as set out in the Children’s Law Reform
Act.143 However, the father argued that the strict definition
140
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should be avoided “by reference to principles of fundamental
justice, including Charter values.”144 Although he did not
explicitly raise a Charter argument, the father relied expressly
on the ratio in Trociuk in asserting that the definition of ‘father’
“may be ripe for reconsideration.”145 Without an explicit
constitutional challenge, however, the court did not decide the
Charter issue.146 The mother asserted that if the adoption were
to fail, she would prefer to seek custody herself rather than
have the father obtain custody. But the court determined that
she had no such right: “the adoption placement is vulnerable as
to the father only and not as to the mother.”147 A new hearing
was ordered in which the adoptive parents’ petition to dispense
1. The person is married to the mother of the child at the time of the
birth of the child.
2. The person was married to the mother of the child by a marriage
that was terminated by death or judgment of nullity within 300 days
before the birth of the child or by divorce where the decree nisi was
granted within 300 days before the birth of the child.
3. The person marries the mother of the child after the birth of the
child and acknowledges that he is the natural father.
4. The person was cohabiting with the mother of the child in a
relationship of some permanence at the time of the birth of the child
or the child was born within 300 days after they ceased to cohabit.
5. The person has certified the child’s birth, as the child’s father,
under the Vital statistics Act or a similar act in another jurisdiction in
Canada.
6. The person has been found or recognized in his lifetime by a court
of competent jurisdiction in Canada to be the father of the child”
(Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C.12, s 8(1)).
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with consent and the father’s custody claim would be heard on
the same evidentiary basis to save time and money; the mother,
however, would not have standing.148
This case provides a clear example of why ‘show
cause’ procedures, with regard to notification or investigations
by the Children’s Aid Society and provisions to dispense with
consent, would inevitably be inadequate. It also suggests why
mothers require sole rights over the infant. The father was not
violent or abusive, although he was clearly unsupportive and
manipulative, and the mother would not have had standing to
exclude him. Yet his interference violates her reproductive
autonomy, her dignity and her equality rights. He clearly chose
parenthood only after his desire that the mother abort was
thwarted. The mother felt herself unable to carry through with
an abortion, but she also did not feel herself to be ready to raise
a child on her own and she did not consider the father capable
of raising the child himself. Had she known the outcome of
these proceedings, she might have chosen abortion, whatever
her own beliefs or feelings, and no woman should be forced
into this position. The father clearly did not intend to procreate
and recreational sexual relations should not entitle men to
parental rights.149
Yet fathers’ rights claims “have obtained considerable
purchase in both the legal and popular culture,”150 and in a
culture obsessed with DNA and genetic ancestry, the caring
work of mothers in pregnancy (and of social parents as children
148
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grow up) is given short shift.151 Fathers’ rights groups, many of
which advance claims over children on the basis of genetics
alone, are politically powerful.152 Fathers’ rights commentators
assert that “to override the father’s long-term interest in
bringing into the world a new life because of a nine-month
physical burden on the mother is short-sighted.”153
Considerable sympathy exists for the position of the so-called
‘thwarted father’ who loses, through adoption, “any
opportunity he might otherwise have had to know his child.”154
But the potential loss for the father must be measured against
the risks imposed on the mother. The rhetoric of many fathers’
rights groups invites “no inquiry at all into the conditions under
which the woman became pregnant.”155 And legal
commentators and supporters of fathers’ genetic rights often
describe women who refuse to notify fathers as dishonest and
“bent on duping … eager, yet unsuspecting, father[s].”156 But
the mother has interests of her own at stake and too often
women are afraid of societal or parental disapproval or the
violence of former partners. It should be noted, as well, that
women are particularly vulnerable to domestic violence when
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pregnant, and when trying to leave relationships.157 The law has
an obligation to protect such women, and their right to safety
and self-determination over-rides the desire of men to ‘know’
children that they didn’t have any intention of fathering. The
relationship between father and child is potential, not actual,
and protecting that potential relationship comes at the price of
disrespecting the actual relationship between the gestational
mother and the child, and the considerable labor and risk of
pregnancy. These cases beg the question: is a man a father
simply by virtue of ejaculation? By upholding the decontextualized equality rights of unwed fathers, courts have
violated the section 15 and section 7 rights of women.
PART III: WOMEN’S SECTION 15 AND SECTION 7
CHARTER RIGHTS
As Nancy Erickson asserts, “for a man, by virtue of an
accidental pregnancy, to get parental rights over the objection
157
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of the pregnant woman in effect means that a woman who
accidentally gets pregnant is deemed married to the source of
the sperm for the purposes of decisions regarding the child.”158
It is problematic that marriage is considered in law to be proof
that a man is committed to parenthood;159 it is even more
problematic to make an unmarried woman subject to the whims
of a man who has no legal obligation to support or care for her,
emotionally or financially, and who may, in fact, have treated
her with serious disrespect, up to and including violence
against her person. The ability of men to interfere in adoption
placement, a fundamental component of reproductive freedom,
violates women’s right to equality under section 15 by denying
the historic discrimination against single mothers and their
current economic vulnerability. Most women who contemplate
adoption are disadvantaged, often in multiple ways, and as
L’Heureux-Dube J. asserted in New Brunswick (Minister of
Health and Community Services v. G. (J.) (1999) “New
Brunswick”, “issues involving parents who are poor necessarily
disproportionately affect women and therefore raise equality
concerns and the need to consider women's perspectives.”160
158
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The court has failed abjectly in this regard. Single mothers, not
men who have sired children out of wedlock, constitute a
distinct minority subject to historical discrimination. As Hester
Lessard cogently argues, fathers have not been subject to
negative stereotypes or discrimination and formal equality
analysis erases the long and painful history of discrimination
against single mothers.161 The potential father’s contribution to
conception is not equal to the contribution of the mother.
Pregnancy is uncomfortable and involves weight gain,
tiredness and, for some, nausea, restricted mobility and an
increased risk of “medical problems like high blood pressure
and diabetes.”162 Despite medical advances, pregnancy
continues to create risk not only to the mother’s health, but also
to her life.163 There is simply no comparison with “men who
have ejaculated their sperm.”164 The mother who provides life,
care, and economic support for a child for nine months is not
similarly situated to the father of her child. At the time of birth,
the gestational mother “is not only the primary caretaker
parent, she is the only caretaker parent.”165 This assertion is not
a retreat into essentialism. In fact, “ignoring the different
biological positioning of birth mothers and fathers gives rise to
the risk of reinforcing a cruder genetic essentialism, which
suggests that genes are central to, and the most important part
of, identity.”166 Nor is this acknowledgement of difference
161
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based on “false and pejorative associations” with regard to
fathers or potential fathers;167 instead, formal equality analysis
erases the history of discrimination against single mothers.168
As consent to adoption cases reveal, single mothers have
consistently been viewed with disrespect, more as a source of
infants for infertile couples than as capable, loving mothers.
Despite this fact, the equality rights of men, not women, have
been upheld in adoption cases, delivering Charter equality with
a vengeance. Mothers, moreover, are vulnerable to abuse
during pregnancy and when trying to leave relationships, and
forcing women to disclose pregnancies and include fathers in
planning for children puts women at risk of abuse, a further
violation of their equality rights and their rights to bodily
integrity.
Moreover, allowing men to intervene in adoption
violates women’s section 7 rights to liberty and security of the
person by interfering with women’s “physical and
psychological integrity”169 with regard to the pregnancy itself.
The Supreme Court of Canada has upheld that “the right to
liberty guaranteed under s.7 of the Charter gives a woman the
right to decide for herself whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy,”170 but this right is meaningless if she is forced to
reveal her pregnancy to an abusive father or to someone she
simply does not want in her life, and to give him a voice in the
disposition of the child. The fact that men do not have any right
to intervene in the decision to abort was confirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in 1989. The argument of Guy
Tremblay (himself an abusive man)171 that he had an interest in
167
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168
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the fetus and could prevent his girlfriend’s abortion was based,
like arguments regarding adoption notification, “on the
proposition that the potential father’s contribution to the act of
conception gives him an equal say in what happens to the
fetus.”172 However, the Supreme Court confirmed that no man
has a “right to veto a woman’s decision in respect to the fetus
she is carrying.”173 Women are not obligated to tell men that
they are pregnant, and can abort without interference. By slow
degrees, however, legislatures and lower courts are coming to
assert that the father can veto a woman’s decision with regard
to the disposition of the child at birth. But “the pregnant
woman needs to know that if she foregoes … her right to abort,
the state will enforce her plans for the child’s future.”174 In
Canada, a woman cannot feel certain that she will have such
control. And this provides abusive men with yet another legal
weapon with which to control women who are trying to protect
themselves and their children. As Wilson J. noted in 1988, the
right to control pregnancy “is an integral part of modern
woman’s struggle to assert her dignity and worth as a human
being.”175 I would argue further that the right to control the
disposition of the child at birth is integral to our struggles for
dignity and autonomy. As the Supreme Court articulated in
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), the
liberty interest “is engaged where state compulsions or
prohibitions affect important and fundamental life choices.”176
Reproductive decisions – abortion and adoption – are certainly
992; R v Tremblay, 2003 ABCA 33; and R v Tremblay, [2004] SCCA
No 359.
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fundamental life choices. State interference, via the recognition
of the uninvolved father as a parent, is unconstitutional. A
woman’s section 7 rights to liberty and security of the person
with regard to termination of pregnancy and disposition of the
baby at birth through adoption must be considered while
“[taking into] account the principles and purposes of the
equality guarantee.”177 As L’Heureux-Dube J. asserted
forcefully in New Brunswick, without such integrated analysis,
our Constitution will not respond “to the realities and needs of
all members of society.”178 Current law with regard to newborn
adoption responds to the needs of men and denies the reality of
women’s lives. Women who contemplate third party adoption
still do so in a world in which their employment options are
inferior to those of men and are compromised by childbirth and
child-rearing;179 daycare is expensive and difficult to obtain;180
the majority of childcare work, even in two-parent households,
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is performed by women;181 stigma attaches to single female
parenthood;182 and male partners can be abusive with
impunity.183 In this context, both abortion and adoption remain
essential reproductive options for women, options with which
no man should have a right to interfere. Current law violates
women’s rights to reproductive autonomy, their equality rights,
and their security of the person.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has argued that the unfettered right to release a
newborn child for third party adoption is an essential
component of women’s reproductive autonomy. It is also
essential to women’s dignity and equality rights. To force the
mother to abide by the wishes of a father (who may be
manipulative, controlling, or violent, or who may simply have
been a disinterested and unsupportive party during the
181
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pregnancy) is to force her to become a breeding machine for a
man she does not want in her life. I do not dispute, in fact I
celebrate, the capacity of fathers to nurture and care for
children. However, this capacity should be exercised, at the
time of birth, through the choice of the mother, as a result of
cooperation and of supportive behavior on the part of the
father. The “father’s experience of parenthood as genetic
contribution (achieved through sexual intercourse)” is not
comparable to the mother’s far more significant role over the
nine-month period of gestation and childbirth.184 Ejaculation
cannot be equated with fatherhood. But carrying a pregnancy to
term is acting as a mother. In this context “it [is] appropriate to
vest the gestational mother with sole parental status.”185 In
recognition of the nine months of pregnancy, and of the
mother’s settled intention to parent, the gestational mother,
even in the context of legal marriage, should have sole control
over the fate of the newborn child.186 After all, a married father
184
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could also be manipulative, violent, or simply unsupportive.
The mother can, and most times will, choose to welcome a coparent into the emergent family at the time of birth, through
birth registration, cohabitation and/or the commencement of a
relationship between the baby and a third party, who need not
be the genetic father.187 But she must also have the right to
exclude the genetic father, whatever his legal relationship to
her. This is essential to her potential safety, and the well-being
of her child.188 The mother must also be able to choose to
relinquish her own claim on the child, and to transfer parental
rights and responsibilities to a third party or parties, without the
interference of the genetic father.189 To allow a man to interfere
187
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in this life-changing decision vitiates a woman’s right to
equality and undermines her liberty and security of the person.
Newborn adoption is an essential component of women’s
reproductive autonomy.
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